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AT SEA WITH THE 89th CONGRESS:
THE UNITED STATES
FISHERIES ZONE
By GARY G. SnaEmRm*
"200-Boat Russ Fishing Fleet 'Invades' Coast",
"Big Russ Fleet Drives U.S. Fishermen Back to Port."1
]HEADLINES of April 11, 1966 signalled the start of an unprece-
dented campaign for protection of the coastal fishery resources of the
United States. The Soviet bottomfish fleet, operating sometimes less
than twelve miles2 off the Oregon and Washington coasts, presented
an immediate and serious threat of depletion to salmon, hake and
other fish stocks.2 The next few months saw the introduction in Con-
gress of no less than a dozen bills designed to establish an offshore
area of exclusive United States fishing rights. Throughout the summer
of 1966, Pacific Northwest interests4 pushed the fishery zone idea, and
Congress responded. In mid-October, Public Law 89-6585 declared a
twelve-mile fisheries zone stretching uniformly along the United States
coastline.
This law has been described as a "novel and dangerous proposal
for review by the World Community "0 Faced with a conservation
0 Member, Second Year Class.
1 From the front pages of the San Pedro News Pilot and The Daily Astonan,
quoted in Pacific Fisherman, May 1966, p. 7.
2 This was a much-debated issue between coastal fishermen, who insisted the Rus-
sians were taking salmon up to three miles off the coast, and Bureau of Commercial
Fisheries representatives, who reported they had no evidence that the Soviets were tak-
ing anything but hake at least ten miles offshore. There was agreement, however, that
most of the fleet worked between twelve and thirty miles from the coast. See Pacific
Fisherman, Aug. 1966, p. 19; Fishing Gazette, Aug. 1966, p. 54.
3The Soviets admitted that they intended to net 220 million pounds of hake by
the end of the year. The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries estimated that the area could
safely surrender only 200 million pounds per year. Pacific Fisherman, Sept. 1966, p. 19.
- Among them: the Halibut Fishermen's Wives Ass'n, wlch petitioned Congress
for a 200-mile territorial sea. Fishing Gazette, June 1966, p. 110. A more significant and
realistic approach was that of the Ass'n of Pacific Fisheries, the Fishing Vessel Owners"
Ass'n, Inc., the Deep Fishermen's Umon, and the Northwest Fisheries Ass'n, which
jointly urged upon Congress a twelve-mile fisheries zone. Fishing Gazette, July 1966,
p. 84; Pacific Fisherman, July 1966, p. 20.
For reasons discussed later, the tuna interests stood against the proposed legislation.
r 80 Stat. 908 (1966).
6 Testimony of August Felando, general manager, American Tunaboat Association,
in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 24, 314
(1966).
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crisis off its shores, the United States might be regarded as having
taken a rather arrogant approach to the solution-unilaterally declar-
mg ownership by the United States of all fish stocks within twelve
miles from shore. Such action necessarily reduces the extent of the
ocean's bounty which is the common property of all nations. Public
Law 89-658 is therefore a matter of international concern, and its
propriety must ultimately depend on the status of the law of nations.
Considering the emotional atmosphere which engendered this
statute, and the conspicuous lack of effective opposition to its enact-
ment, it is appropriate to examine both the validity of this statute
under international law, and the future which it portends. It is pro-
posed to ascertain the nature of international understanding in this
area and its bearing on the United States fisheries zone through (1)
examination of the nature of jurisdictions in coastal waters; (2) analy-
sis of the present significance of the question as to what distance from
shore such jurisdictions may be extended; and (3) consideration of
the fisheries zone statute in view of recent trends in the practice of
nations.
JURISDICTION IN COASTAL WATERS
One fact is certain: the sovereign power of a state does not end
conclusively at the water's edge. Coastal states, in one manner or an-
other, exercise degrees of "control" in areas adjacent to their coastlines.
Such areas are termed "jurisdictions," and are classified according to
the nature and intensity of involvement within the jurisdiction by the
coastal state. To fully understand the system of jurisdictions in coastal
waters, it is necessary to examine briefly its historical bases.
The oceans of the world have long served as the very embodiment
of freedom. While less creative men simply mused and versified about
the sea and the unfettered spirit,7 early lawyers, notably those of
Rome, established the principle that the sea itself was free and in-
capable of appropriation. "For centuries, because of the vastness of
the sea and the limited relations between States, the use of the sea was
subject to no rules; every State could use it as it pleased."9
The initial Roman concept did not, however, withstand the ebul-
lience of the European nation-states of the 15th and 16th centuries.
7 An example is the Greek poet Moschus (250 B.C.), whose Idyl V begms:
"When gently skims the breeze the waters blue,
High swells my heart and kindles at the view;
The dull unmoving land delights no more,
The halcyon calm allures me from the shore."
(Milman translation).
8 JEssup, TERITORrAL WATERs AND MAITMM JURIsDICTION 3 (1927) [heremafter
cited as Jessup].
9 judge Alvarez m Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116, 146.
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Not only did sovereigns announce claims to exclusive property in
coastal waters, but entire expanses of ocean were soon subjected to
assertions of national control. Vemce claimed the Adriatic;10 Spain for-
bade others from navigation m the western part of the Atlantic, the
Pacific and the Gulf of Mexico; Portugal reserved the southern At-
lantic and the Indian Ocean. 1 The sea was fast becoming as much the
subject of domnimon as the continents.
This milieu inspired the 1609 publication of Hugo Grotius' Mare
Liberum-a stringent plea for freedom of the seas "for the innocent
use and mutual benefit of all."2 Mare Liberum was the wellspring of
the now-axiomatic doctrine of the freedom of the seas. It was a dis-
tinguished Dutch jurist's reinterpretation of earlier Roman analysis:
possession is the sine qua non of property; the oceans, like the celestial
bodies, cannot be occupied, and therefore must remain res communns.13
The nations of Europe embraced Grotius and his principles, but
nevertheless were hesitant to release the sea from all coastal restraints.14
Each nation found it difficult to accept the proposition that all sover-
eignty ceased where the ocean washed the beach. Accordingly, mar-
gmal seas remained subject to varying degrees of control by coastal
states. Three centuries of evolution produced an assortment of pre-
cisely defined jurisdictions on the oceans. They are: inland waters, the
territorial sea and the high seas.
Inland Waters
International law is settled as to the validity of exclusive state
sovereignty over inland waters. Within this zone are features such as
enclosed seas, rivers, harbors and bays. In addition, utilization of a
straight baseline system15 may classify significant areas of coastal sea
as inland waters. The distinctive feature of inland waters is that the
extent of jurisdiction is as comprehensive as that over the land itself.1
10 JOHNSTON, THE NTERNATIONAL LAW OF FIsHE=ms 161 (1965).
11 JssP 4; MEYmi, THE Ex=rr OF JumEsDIcToN iN COASTAL WATERS 4 (1937).
12 MEYEm, op. cit. supra note 11, at 23.
1 3 See FENwIcE, INTERATiONAL LAw 497 (4th ed. 1965); JoHNSTON, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 165, 173; 1 O'CoNNELL, INTERNATiONAL LAW 524 (1965).
14 See JFssur 7.
15 The territorial sea is measured from a baseline which ordinarily follows the low-
water edge of the coast. In special situations of gross coastal irregularity (the Norwe-
gian coast is an example), international law allows a nation to disregard the sinuosities
of the coastline and to measure the territorial sea from a straight baseline drawn across
the mouths of indentations-so that the territorial sea takes on a more uniform shape
as a consequence. Waters which lie to the inland side of a straight baseline are inland
waters. See Sorensen, Law of the Sea, 520 INr'L CoNC. 195, 236-40 (1958); Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case, [19511 I.C.J. Rep. 116.
16 2 O'CoNNmL, op. cit. supra note 13, at 669.
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Territorial Sea
Stretching along the coastline is a strip of ocean described as the
territorial sea, over which a coastal nation claims territorial rights.
Within this marginal zone, "a state may exercise any jurisdiction
and do any act which it may lawfully do upon its own land territory."T
In this respect, the nature of territorial sea jurisdiction is as compre-
hensive as that of inland waters. However, the territorial sea is subject
to an important international servitude called the right of innocent
passage.' 8 Thus, a foreign vessel 9 may proceed in an "innocent" man-
ner through a coastal state's territorial sea, providing the vessel meets
any requirements exacted by local laws for the protection of interests
such as navigation and customs. -°
Beyond the territorial sea lie the high seas, which are free and open
to navigation by all states. The high seas are the legacy of Grotius and
the Romans, conceived to remain inviolate and receptive to even the
weakest of nations. Although it has been observed that no nation may
have "preferential rights"21 to the high seas, modem practice is to the
contrary Through two recent jurisdictional innovations-the conti-
nental shelf and the contiguous zone-coastal states are carving out
choice preferential rights from the high seas sector. The nature and
extent of these two jurisdictions are quite unsettled, but their presence
demands their examination.
Continental Shelf
The continental shelf jurisdiction achieved prominence with the
Truman Proclamation 22 of September 1945, wherein the United States
declared the resources of the continental shelf subject to this country's
17 JssUs xxxiv. For an analysis of the clanns to authority mi the territorial sea, see
McDouGAL & BuRxKE, ThE Punric ORDER oF Tm OcEANs 179-83 (1962).
18 FENwiCK, op. cit. supra note 13, at 468; Dean, The Second Geneva Conference
on the Law of the Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the Seas, 54 Am. J. INr'L L. 751, 753
(1960).
19 The question as to whether warships are entitled to exercise this servitude is
discussed briefly infra; amplification may be found in Slonim, Right of Innocent Passage
and the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, 5 CoLun. J. TRANsN. L. 96
(1966).
20 "The enjoyment of this right (innocent jassage) may be conditioned upon the
observance of special regulations laid down by the littoral state for the protection of
navigation and the execution of municipal laws "FE~wix, op. cit. supra note 13,
at 468.
2 1 MEYER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 3. "As the open sea is not under the sway of
any State, no State can exercise its jurisdiction there." 1 OPPNmm, INTERNATONAL
LAW 330 (Lauterpacht, 8th ed. 1955).
2259 Stat. 884 (1945). The text of the proclamation may be found i 40 Am. J.
Iwr'x L. Sup,. 45-46 (1946).
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"jurisdiction and control."21 Although the United States subsequently
disclaimed any pretense of extending "sovereignty" over the continen-
tal shelf,24 the avowed purpose of the proclamation was to permit
exclusive extraction of seabed natural resources. This is, at least,
"sovereignty" over such resources.25 The draftsmen of the Proclamation
took precautions to make it clear that superjacent waters were to re-
main high seas; navigation on the surface of the waters above the
continental shelf was to continue unimpeded; free-swimming fish in
these waters remained common property The concept of continental
shelf junsdiction was thus formulated, and the United States declara-
tion was duplicated by other countries. 6 The 1958 Geneva Conference
on the Law of the Sea resulted in the Convention on the Continental
Shelf,27 which went into effect after sufficient ratification on June 10,
1964.28 The Convention stipulates that the term "continental shelf'
refers to the seabed between the outer limit of the territorial sea and
the 200-meter depth contour line. Actually, the 200-meter line is only
the minimum outer limit, because the continental shelf is defined as
extending beyond that limit where the coastal state finds itself equipped
to harvest the seabed resources at deeper levels. 9 It is therefore to be
expected that the continental shelf will proceed seaward as time pro-
gresses and technology improves. Coastal states therefore have sover-
eign rights to all the natural resources 0 of the continental shelf, a zone
which may, in practice, extend hundreds of miles from shore.a
23 For discussion see FENwicF, op. cit. supra note 13, at 448.
24 JOHNSTON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 232-33.
25 "Is a claim to sovereignty over the shelf equivalent to inclusion of the shelf
within the national boundary, so that it becomes the public domain and property of the
sovereign? When, by design, a claim is tantamount to an exercise of the incidents
of ownership, it seems highly artificial to erect a distinction between tmpertum and
dommium." 1 O'CoNwELL, op. cit. supra note 13, at 575.
26 See FhNicx, op. cit. supra note 13, at 448; 1 O'CoNNsLL, op. cit. supra note 13,
at 574.
27 U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.55 (1958).
28 R. Johnson, Fishery Developments in the Pacific, in DEvEoswmrrs xi =. LAW
OF E SEA 1958-1964, at 143 (British Institute of International and Comparative Law
Special Publication No. 6, 1965). See note 54 infra.
29 Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 27, art. 1.
3o "Resources" includes not only mineral substances and vegetation, but also
sedentary organisms "which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the
seabed or are unable to move except m constant physical contact with the seabed or the
subsoil." Id. art. 2, para. 4. Abalone, clams and oysters fit this description; shrimp and
lobster do not.
3i Technically, the Convention on the Continental Shelf binds only those countries
which are parties to the Convention. The persuasiveness of the Geneva conventions re-
suits from the widespread international acceptance of the documents through ratification.
The conventions are, therefore, the most authoritative formulations of international law
in this area. See note 54 mnfra.
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Contiguous Zone
The territorial sea must not be confused with the jurisdictional
province termed the "contiguous zone." Customary international law
permits a coastal state to exercise certain "police measures" of "domes-
tic concern"32 in an area beyond the limit of the territorial sea. Thus,
where the breadth of the territorial sea has proved too narrow for the
purposes of controlling smuggling, immigration, and other activities
regulated by local law, the contiguous zone has provided the coastal
state with jurisdictional justification on the high seas. The Geneva Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 8 provides that
the coastal state may exercise control within a twelve-mile zone for"customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary"34 purposes. Since the breadth
of the contiguous zone is to be measured from the same baseline which
demarcates the inner boundary of the territorial sea, it is obvious that
the contiguous zone may exist only when the territorial sea is less than
twelve miles wide.85
It has been shown that there are two "buffer zones" between the
territorial sea and the high seas. Theoretically, the outer limit of the
territorial sea is also the commencement of the high seas. The high seas
remain the common property of all nations; but, like the landowner
who has conveyed away his mineral rights and granted easements to
his neighbors, the international community has lost much of its propri-
832 Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished,
52 Am. J. INT'L L. 607, 623 (1958). "The United States, since 1790, has claimed its
right to enforce anti-smuggling measures within twelve miles of its shores." Ibid.
83 U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.52 (1958).
84 Id. pt. II, art. 24, para. 1. It should be noted that the Convention limits con-
tiguous zone regulation to four specific objectives; exclusive fishery control is not men-
tioned. The 1958 Geneva Conference instead relegated the fisheries issue to a separate
instrument, the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.54 (1958). This instrument was the last of
the four to enter into force when the Netherlands became the twenty-second nation to
ratify on Feb. 18, 1966. Commercial Fisheries Review, June 1966, p. 47. See note 54
infra. As its title suggests, this document embodies a plan for the rational, shared harvest
of the living resources of the high seas. It makes no attempt to establish limits to juns-
dictional encroachment upon the high seas. Its terms can properly apply only to those
seas which have heretofore been common property and therefore subject to the collective
acts of resource-depletion of all nations. This Convention thusly has no direct bearing
upon the legality of the fisheries zone. It is, however, an initial step toward the shared
conservation of the oceans-a goal which would eliminate the economic "necessity"
which moves nations to extend jurisdictional limits.
35 Sorensen, supra note 15, at 241. "It is therefore implied that the maritime area
which is subject to the sovereiguty of the State may be coterminous with the area in
which it may take certain steps to protect itself from certain threatened injures, despite
the fact that the latter area is described as one contiguous to the territorial sea and is
conceived of as a part of the high seas." Jessup, The United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, 59 COLum. L. REv. 234, 244 (1959).
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etary interest mn the high seas through the devices of the continental
shelf and the contiguous zone.
THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTIONAL EXTENT
As has been explained, proper analysis of the United States fisheries
statute requires two preliminary undertakings. The initial step-that of
examining the established categories of jurisdictons-must now be
supplemented with consideration of the question which overshadows
the validity of the fisheries zone: to what breadth may a nation extend
its jurisdictional zone?
Of all the maritime zones, the territorial sea is by its very nature
the most significant. Its outer limit is both the termination of absolute
sovereignty and the commencement of the free highway of nations.
Although the continental shelf and the contiguous zone blur somewhat
the seaward boundary of coastal control, the concern of nations re-
mains fixed upon the frontier of the territorial sea, at which ceases the
cherished freedom of navigation. The jurisdictions which have ex-
tended beyond the territorial sea have not directly affected the two
interests which have the most at stake in navigational freedom: the
military and merchant shipping.
The servitude of innocent passage is an "inseparable concomitant"
of the territorial sea. 6 It has never been disputed that innocent passage
comprehends foreign merchant ships 37-- but the question of extension
of this right to foreign warships has not been as settled.88 The Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone provides that
passage shall be considered innocent "so long as it is not pre]udicial to
the peace, good order or security of the coastal State."39 No distinction
is made at this point between warships and merchant vessels; however,
a special provision requires submarines "to navigate on the surface and
to show their flag."40 Such lack of distinction-which was a considera-
ble concession to the maritime powers-is hedged by further articles4
winch provide, in general, that traversing vessels must comply with
laws and regulations enacted by the coastal state. Article 23, the only
specific treatment on warships, provides:
If any warship does not comply with the regulations of the coastal
State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards
any request for compliance which is made to it, the coastal State may r
require the warship to leave the territorial sea.
86 2 O'CoumrLr, op. cit. supra note 13, at 688.
37 Ibzd. See JEssup 5; MEYER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 445.
88 See Corfu Channel Case, [19491 I.C.J. Rep. 4; Slomm, supra note 19.
39 U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.52 (1958), art. 14, para. 4.
40 Id. para. 6.
41 Arts. 17, 19, 20, 22.
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It must be remembered that the Convention is binding only upon
parties to it;42 refractory nations are committed to the position that
warship passage can never be innocent. Moreover, certain parties to
the Convention have made reservations to the effect that the coastal
state may nevertheless arbitrarily determine when a warship may
pass.
43
This should serve to dispel any impressions that the right of ino-
cent passage effectively saves to foreign vessels n the territorial sea all
privileges of high seas navigation. Indeed, the possibility of a general
extension of territorial sea boundaries poses serious threats to the free
movement around the world of military and commercial craft, both on
the sea and in the air.44 For although the international law of the sea
reserves to surface vessels the right of innocent passage, aircraft have
the benefit of no such servitude. The right to overfly a nation's sover-
eign territory depends entirely upon treaty 45 Thus, where widening
territorial waters remove from the high seas heavily traveled narrows
such as the Strait of Gibraltar, not only must ocean vessels be subjected
to coastal restraints in order to pass from one part of the high seas to
another, but the air corridors superjacent to such areas are closed
pending agreement on rights of overflight. These considerations ac-
count for the gravity and immediacy of the issue of permissible tern-
tonal sea boundaries. All these contingencies are bottomed in the last
analysis on the one crucial inquiry wich pervades the entire mterna-
tional law of the sea: how far does international law permit a state to
extend its territorial sea?46
Background
It is sufficient for the purposes of this comment to state in few
words the progression of international understanding in this area prior
to the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Conferences. 47 It is not disputed that a
marginal sea three miles in width had become common international
practice by the middle of the nineteenth century 8 The United States
49
42 See note 54 infra.
43 2 O'CoNNEm, op. cit. supra note 13, at 696. See Comment, 7 HAr. Ilet L.
CLuB J. 113 (1965), which examines the Soviet attitude.
44 "In addition, the maritime states are seriously concerned that any extensions of
the territorial sea and regulation therein by coastal states could easily make surface sea
voyages or commercial aircraft flights much more lengthy and costly, and, in many cases,
commercially unfeasible or unprofitable." Dean, supra note 18, at 755. See McDouGAL
& BunmE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 174-75; Dean, supra note 32, at 611.
45 Dean, supila note 32, at 612. See Lawrence, Military-Legal Considerations in the
Extension of Territorial Seas, 29 Mm.. L. REv. 47, 93 (1965).
40 Sorensen, supra note 15, at 242.
47 For comprehensive treatment of the historical background of the territorial sea,
see JEssuP and M.yEa, op. cit. supra note 11.
48 See Sorensen, supra note 15, at 242.
49 "Consistent with its support of the principle of the freedom of the seas, the
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and Great Britain have been champions of the three-mile limit for more
than a century and a half. However, the opposition to such a limited
territorial sea has never allowed the matter to go unchallenged. In
1930, the Hague Conference for the Progressive Codification of Inter-
national Law adjourned leaving undecided the issue of permissible
width of territorial waters.50 No agreement having decided to the
contrary, the maritime powers continued to consider as unchanged the
historic validity of the three-mile limit. Nevertheless, the trend toward
wider territorial seas did not abate. Nations which broadened their
territorial waters by unilateral declaration justified such action on
grounds of security or requirements calling for preservation of offshore
fishery resources.15 In its eighth session in 1956, the International Law
Commission reported the situation:
The Commission recogmzes that international practice is not uniform
as regards the delimitation of the territonal sea. [I]nternational
law does not permit an extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve
miles. The Commission notes, on the one hand, that many
States have fixed a breadth greater than three miles and, on the other
hand, that many States do not recogmze such a breadth when that of
their own territorial sea is less.52
Such were the conditions when the Conference on the Law of the
Sea convened in Geneva in February 1958.53 The Conference set out
to accomplish that which stymied the Commission; but, despite suc-
cesses in less controverted areas,"4 the overriding issue was not re-
solved. So apparent was it that a three-mile agreement had no hope
of success that the United States and the United Kingdom offered a
United States has always adhered to the 3-mile rule. From the time of Jefferson, the
principle that the marginal belt extends one marine league (3 geographical or nautical
miles) from the low-water mark has been supported by the State Department, by court
decisions, and by treaties." Phleger, Recent Developments Affecting the Regime of the
High Seas, 32 DEP'T STATE BULL. 934, 935 (1955).
50 McDouGA, & BumK, op. cit. supra note 17, at 524; Dean, supra note 32, at 613.
51 McDou AL & BuRE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 452.
52 U.N. GEN. Ass. OF. BEc. 11th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 4 (A/3159) (1956).
5 3 As the Conference opened, 23 nations clained territorial seas of 3 miles; 17
states clanied 4-6 miles; 13 claimed 7-12 miles; and 9 claimed the sea above the con-
tinental shelf. Remaining states gave no indication of their limits, or claimed territorial
seas "in accordance with international law." Sorensen, supra note 15, at 244.
54 Four conventions were produced by the Conference: the Convention on the Ter-
ritorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (entered into force on Sept. 10, 1964); the Con-
vention on the High Seas (entered into force on Sept. 30, 1962); the Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (entered into force
on March 20, 1966); and the Convention on the Continental Shelf (entered into force
on June 10, 1964).
The United States Senate advised and consented to the ratification of all four con-
ventions on May 26, 1960. 106 CONG. PEc. 11196 (1960). The conventions were ratified
by the President on March 24, 1961. 44 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 609 (1961).
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compromise-later narrowly defeated-which proposed a territorial
sea of six miles coupled with an additional six-mile exclusive fishery
zone.55 The most zealous advocates of the three-mile rule conditionally
abandoned 6 their position for the purpose of achieving some stability
on the issue of territorial waters.
A small achievement of the 1958 Conference may be found in
Article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone. As has been seen, this article expressly limits the width of the
contiguous zone to twelve miles, measured from the baseline of the
territorial sea. Since the contiguous zone necessarily merges into
the territorial sea, the immediate implication of this provision is that
the territorial sea cannot exceed twelve miles: the contiguous zone is
a "residue" of jurisdiction beyond the total sovereignty of the territorial
sea, and a limit upon the former must of necessity restrict the latter.
However, the great controversy centers on the area between three and
twelve miles, so this provision has done nothing more than spotlight
the arena of contest.
The proximity of success at the 1958 Conference promoted enthu-
siasm for one more chance to settle the outstanding problems of the
width of the territorial sea and fishery zones. The United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly responded by convemng the 1960 Geneva Conference
on the Law of the Sea in March 1960.57 Again, the United States, this
time jointly with Canada, proposed a "six and six' plan which failed
by only one vote to gain adoption.58 The Conference accordingly
ended one vote short of success.
The failure common to both conferences was practically assured by
the political jousting which supplanted deliberate, temperate negotia-
tion. The maritime nations, including the United States, Great Britain,
55 McDoucAL & BuRmi, op. cit. supra note 17, at 529. "The position adopted by
the United States was this: Although it believed the three-mile limit firmly established
in international law, and although it regarded that limit as a proper compromise between
the interests of the coastal states and the principle of freedom of the seas, it was willing
to explore other proposals in the hope of achieving agreement." Dean, supra note 32, at
614.
56 McDoucAL & Bumx, op. cit. supra note 17, at 451.
That is, the United States made it clear that it was not implying a recognition that
international law sanctioned a territorial sea beyond the three-mile limit. See testimony
of Arthur H. Dean, Chairman of the United States delegations, in Hearing on Executives
J, K, L, M, N, Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
9 (1960).
57 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 13th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 54-55 (A/4090) (1958).
58 "The vote was 54 m favor, 28 against, and 5 abstentions." McDouGAL & Btmtx,
THE PuBLic OBDER oF = OcExNs 547 n.305 (1962). See D. H. N. Johnson, Develop-
ments Since the Geneva Conferences of 1958 and 1960: Anglo-Scandinavian Agreements
Concerning the Territorial Sea and Fishing Limits, 10 Ibr'L & COMP. L.Q. 587, 589
(1961).
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Japan, France, West Germany, Holland, Belgium and Greece, 9 di-
rected their efforts toward conserving what remained of the three-mile
limit. In the words of Arthur Dean, chairman of the United States dele-
gations to the conferences, the United States maintained its position
"for compelling military and commercial reasons."60 Strategic interests
also moved the Soviet Uion to consider nothing less than twelve miles
as customary international law 61 Many erstwhile colomes refused to
see the three-mile rule as anything but closely associated with eco-
nomic subjugation by the maritime powers. Indeed, there were very
few countries which were not burdened with motives paramount to
the matter of finally codifying the breadth of the territorial sea. Fur-
thermore, the addition of the question of fishery limits only tended to
confuse the discussions. Compromises aimed at the simultaneous satis-
faction of the military and fishing interests of the requisite number of
nations necessary for a two-thirds majority were predestined to fail.
The success of the United States-Canadian proposal would have
been little more than balm on a festering wound. Since the law of
nations is consensual, no nation can legislate for another, and "no rule
of customary international law can exist save by the universal assent
of the nations."6 8 If the deciding vote had been cast at the 1960 Con-
ference, the extent of ratification of the convention would have been
much less than "universal." Those nations which would not have con-
sidered themselves bound by its terms would have been considerably
greater in number than the nations similarly disposed to the four con-
ventions produced at the 1958 Conference. The Soviet Umon and its
satellites, for example, would certainly have regarded the "six and six'
arrangement as insufficient even in compromise.6 4 Thus, had the Con-
ference succeeded where it barely failed, the East-West disagreement
over the width of territorial waters would have been left unresolved.
But this is not to say that success would have been a totally "illusory
triumph.""' The position of the maritime powers would have been
strengthened by whatever certainty would have attached to the issue
of territorial sea breadth. It is uncertainty which prevents the classifi-
cation of conduct into that which is 'legal" or "illegal", and, as has been
explained supra,66 the degree of uncertainty surrounding this issue in
59 Dean, supra note 32, at 610.
60 Ibid.
61 See statement of Soviet Delegation Chairman Grigory Tunkmn m Lawrence, supra
note 45, at 57. "The USSR bloc was insisting, for military reasons, on a twelve-mile or
greater territorial sea " Dean, supra note 32, at 608.
62 McDouGAL & Bumm, op. cit. supra note 58, at 535.
63 Jussu,, TmrroAr WATERs & MAmTnviME JuIsDicroN 8 (1927).
64 See note 61 supra.
65 For speculation on this point, see Economist, April 30, 1960, p. 403.
66 See note 53 supra.
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1958 and 1960 was high indeed. Nations could be forgiven for choosing
to satisfy pressing domestic needs by extending the territorial sea,
when the only alternative was deference to a rule of international law
growing in disrepute. As to those nations least cowed by Eastern viru-
lence, the "Six and six" agreement could have been a forceful precept
-even outside the ranks of parties to the convention-n its formula-
tion of a standard out of what had been hopeless disarray Speculations
such as these make more understandable the decision by the United
States to forfeit its rigid three-mile position in favor of the compromise
proposal.
Developments Since the 1960 Conference
The collapse of the 1960 Conference was a virtual invitation to
those nations eager to extend jurisdiction outward from the shore. The
United Kingdom was destined to suffer the brunt of these initiatives.
The movement actually began two years earlier, only two months after
the 1958 Conference, when Iceland (to no one's surprise) declared a
twelve-mile fishing zone effective September 1, 1958.67 Iceland offered
no saving measure for historic fishing rights. At the Conference, Ice-
land had scorned the "six and six" compromnse as an offer of "Six and
minus six."6 8 Britain refused to recognize the validity of Iceland's ex-
tension,609 and deployed gunboats to protect British trawlers fishing
inside the twelve-mile zone.70 It was only after prolonged tension and
sporadic violence that a settlement. of the situation was attained by an
exchange of notes on March 11, 19 6 1.71 The United Kingdom agreed
that it would "no longer object" 72 to the twelve-mile zone; Iceland
reciprocated by promising to permit British fishing within the outer
six miles of the zone in specified areas and at certain times during the
year, such privilege to expire March 11, 1964.73 A similar agreement
concerning the Faroe Islands had been signed by the United Kingdom
and Denmark on April 27, 1959. 7' There was, however, no provision
for the eventual withdrawal of British boats from the outer six-mile
zone; instead, it was stipulated that, after April 27, 1962, either party
could denounce the agreement on giving one year's notice.75 On April
67 Dean, supra note 32, at 615.
68 New Statesman, Aug. 22, 1959, p. 214.
69 The British realized that Iceland had every intention of eventually claiming the
continental shelf as the limit; for this reason, Britain balked at recognizing any unilateral
declaration by Iceland. Ibid.
7 0 Dean, supra note 32, at 615 n.25.
71 D. H. N. Johnson, European Fishery Limits, in DEvLopmrENs iN TH LAw OF
THE SEA 1958-1964, 48, 49 (British Institute of International and Comparative Law
Special Publication No. 6, 1965).
72 Johnson, supra note 58, at 592.
73 Ibid.
74 Johnson, supra note 71, at 49.
75 Id. at 49 n.4.
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28, 1962, appreciating the Anglo-Icelandic settlement as an example
of what persistence could accomplish, Denmark announced its inten-
tion to dissolve the 1959 Agreement as of April 27, 1963.7' Denmark's
new policy was later made clear: a twelve-mile exclusive fishing zone
with no historic exceptions would apply to the Faroes as of March 12,
1964 (corresponding to the date set in the Anglo-Icelandic settlement)
In addition, a twelve-mile fishing zone would encircle Greenland, with
British vessels allowed to fish m the outer six-mile zone until 1970.77
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom had concluded an agreement with
Norway on November 17, 1960, in which the parties avowedly fol-
lowed the pattern of the United States-Canadian compromise. Nor-
way's exclusive fishing zone was extended to twelve miles; the United
Kingdom was granted the right to fish in the outer six-mile zone until
October 31, 1970.78
These fishing developments came as a flurry of small disasters to
the British fishing industry While some of the most bountiful cod and
herring fisheries were suddenly inaccessible to British offshore fisher-
men, the inshore industry complained that foreign fleets were heed-
lessly over-fishmg British coastal waters.71 It seemed an iromc effrontery
that Britain, subjected to twelve-mile fishing zones by her neighbors,
had no such zone of her own.80 Britain succumbed to this sentiment,
but refused to make a unilateral declaration. Instead, London spon-
sored the European Fisheries Conference from December 1963 to
March 1964. Sixteen nations participated: Iceland, Ireland, Spain, all
seven members of the European Free Trade Association, and all six
members of the Common Market.81 All delegations shared the common
interest in restricting foreign fishermen off their home shores.82 In ad-
dition to three resolutions touching on conservation and trade prac-
tices, the Conference produced a Fisheries Convention adopted by all
the delegations except Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. 3 Denmark
refused to accept the provisions of the Convention as respects Green-
land or the Faroes.84 Again, the general scheme of the "six and six"
compromise was utilized: each contracting party obtained exclusive
fishing rights in a six-mile zone, 5 with the belt between six and twelve
miles to be shared with the contracting parties having historic rights
7o Id. at 50.
77 Id. at 51.
78 Johnson, supra note 58, at 590.
70 Economist, Dec. 7, 1963, p. 1019.
80 Johnson, supra note 71, at 57.
Sl Id. at 55.
82 Economist, May 4, 1963, p. 442.
83 For the text of the Convention, see Johnson, supra note 71, at 75-83.
84 Id. at 58; Economist, March 7, 1964, p. 884.
85 Art. 2.
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in that area.8 The Instoric rights were given no life span, but a pro-
vision was made for any party to renounce the Convention after
twenty years from its effective date.
Since a common apprehension among the parties to the Convention
was the recurring "invasion" of efficient fleets of trawlers owned by
the Soviet Umon 88--not a party to the Convention-it was reasonable
to expect enforcement of the twelve-mile zone against non-parties. The
British made their policy clear almost immediately with the enactment
of the Fishery Limits Act, 1964,89 which went into effect on September
30, 1964. By its provisions, the fishery limits of the British Islands were
extended to twelve miles; designated vessels of foreign registration
were to be permitted to fish in the outer six-mile zone in order to give
effect to "any Convention, agreement or arrangement." 0
Since the close of the 1960 Conference, the twelve-mile fisheries
zone has become not only the trend in international practice; it has
become the rule. By May 1966, nations with coastlines were distributed
as follows: fifteen claimed exclusive fishery jurisdiction three miles
from the coast; twelve clained from four to ten miles; at least sixty
asserted twelve miles; eleven declared zones in excess of twelve miles.91
These statistics effectively demonstrate the balance of world opinion.
It is not unrealistic to observe that the twelve-mile fisheries zone is
rapidly becoming a fact of life.""
Thus, although the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguous Zone omits fishing as a subject of control within an area contig-
uous to the territorial sea, it is obvious that the contiguous fishing
zone has nevertheless assumed a position of importance within
8 Art. 3.
87Art 15.
The upshot of the Convention has been handily described by Professor D. H. N.
Johnson:
[lilt is a six-mile fisheries limit that the Contracting Parties will be applying
inter se, although they may be applying a twelve mile fisheries limit vts-a-vts
other countries. This apparently is the intention, notwithstanding that "the
exclusive right to fish and exclusive ]urisdiction in matters of fishenes within
the belt of six miles measured from the baseline" of the territorial sea of the
coastal State under the Convention (see Article 2 thereof). If it is intended to
keep the fishermen of States not parties to the Convention out of the "outer
six" zone, coastal States will have to make unilateral claims to that effect, rely-
ing for the legality of such claims on developments in customary international
law. Johnson, supra note 71, at 63.88 Economist, supra note 82.
89 1964 c. 72.
90 Section 1.
oi Derived from State Dep't synoptical table, Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 24, 275-77 (1966) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings].
92 Evaluation by Congressman Hastings Keith. Id. at 269.
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the group of maritime jurisdictions. Furthermore, this development
has taken place largely within the past decade. "There are thirty-
nine countries that have gone to twelve miles either by extending their
territorial sea or by extending their fisheries zone to twelve miles since
the 1958 Conference." 8 In 1964, the position of the United States De-
partment of State was that customary international law did not recog-
nize extension of fishing jurisdiction beyond three miles;94 an indication
of how quickly the law has changed is found in the State Departments
support of the 1966 twelve-mile fisheries zone. When asked by a House
Subcommittee for an explanation, the State Department appropriately
replied "(T)imes change."9 5
THE UNITED STATES FISHERIES ZONE
It cannot be disputed that the new United States fisheries zone
does not exceed the limits of customary international law Public Law
89-658 established a contiguous fisheries zone initiating at the edge of
the territorial sea and concluding at a boundary line "drawn so that
each point on the line is nine nautical miles from the nearest point in
the inner boundary " There is no description of the zone in "twelve-
mile" terms. Instead, the zone is conceived as a belt of water nine miles
in breadth and adjacent to the territorial sea. The zone will therefore
remain a "twelve-mile" zone so long as the territorial sea of the United
States remains at three miles. This delimitation has been criticized as
allowing for uncertainty by establishing no definite boundary mea-
sured from the baseline of the territorial sea. 7 The most that can be
said for this argument is that it is techically correct, but quite un-
realistic. It is true that the boundary of the fisheries zone is flexible
because of its fixed relation to the outer limit of the territorial sea,
which has the possibility of expansion. The draftsmen must have con-
sidered the possibility of such an extension and the merger which
would result to a zone affixed to the baseline: no legislator wants that
destroyed which he has sacrificed so much to enact. But it is another
matter to say that this flexibility inpugns the zone's validity under
international law Except for the compromise proposals offered at the
03 Testimony of Raymund T. Yingling, Assistant Legal Adviser, Dep't of State. Id.
at 281.
94 Congress sought State Dep't advice before enacting Public Law 88-308, 78 Stat.
194 (1964), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1081-85 (1964). This statute was the first enforcement mea-
sure enacted to preserve the rights of the United States m its territorial waters. See 110
CONG. PEc. 3174 (1964) (remarks of Congressman Bob Wilson). Public Law 88-308
was recognized as having "set the stage" for future extensions beyond the three-mile
limit. 109 CONG. aEc. 18503 (1963) (remarks of Senator Pell).
95 House Hearings 282.
9 6 Section 2.
9 7 House Heanngs 313 (testimony of August Felando).
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Geneva conferences, the United States has never suggested an exten-
sion of the territorial sea. No serious statesman can question the stabil-
ity of the three-mile limit of the United States. For all practical
purposes, the boundary of the three-mile limit is as secure as the
baseline itself. It is therefore not improper to use the outer limit of
the territorial sea as a monument from which to measure the fisheries
zone.
There is no question that the prohibitions of the statute lie well
within customary international standards. Unlike the European Fish-
eries Convention and some past unilateral declarations," the United
States fisheries zone follows no "six and six" arrangement. The law
provides sinply.
The United States will exercise the same exclusive rights in respect to
fisheries in the zone as it has in its territorial sea, subject to the con-
tinuation of traditional fishing by foreign states within this zone as
may be recognized by the United States. 99
The only possible interpretation of this provision is that the United
States claims sole dominon over fishery resources and control over
fishing activities within the nine-mile contiguous zone. Traditional fish-
ing rights are to be recognized "within this zone" the entire nine-mile
belt is therefore subject to historic rights. This generous concession is
certainly not commanded by international law, since those nations
which have established twelve-mile fishing zones subject to any his-
toric rights at all have usually followed a "six and six" formula which
recognizes no traditional rights within the inner six-mile belt. Public
Law 89-658 permits foreign fishermen who have established traditional
rights to fish within three miles of the coast. Another contingency is
provided for in section 3, which empowers the President to alter the
seaward boundary of the zone whenever he "determines that a portion
of the fisheries zone conflicts with the territorial waters or fisheries
zone of another country "
The Fisheries Zone and the Territorial Sea
Examination of this new legislation must ultimately include its
effect on international understanding regarding the breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea. To any nation determined to preserve the freedom of the
seas-likewise to those states intending to destroy that concept-the
immediate response to any extension of maritime jurisdiction is an
evaluation of its territorial sea consequence: does the extension sanc-
tion clais of territorial sovereignty beyond the three-mile limit?
98 "Tis 'six plus six' proposal has been adopted by Senegal, South Africa, Tumsia,
Turkey, and Uruguay " Lawrence, Military-Legal Considerations in the Extension of
Territorial Seas, 29 Mm. L. hav. 47, 51 (1965). See note 91 supra.
99 Section 1.
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There are two apprehensions that this effect might actually result.
The first is that the United States declaration will accelerate the trend
toward the universal twelve-mile zone, and that zealous nations will
move to protect offshore fishing by extending their territorial seas in
lieu of creating new contiguous zones. The usual reasons advanced by
countries extending territorial seas have not involved questions of se-
curity, control of navigation or the like: nations have very often asserted
the needs of conservation and increased seafood requirements as com-
pelling a wider territorial sea.100 Indeed, almost fifty per cent of the
countries which exhibit twelve-mile fishing limits have such boundaries
only because their territorial seas are twelve miles wide.' 01 Many of
these nations broadened their territorial waters at the insistence of
national fishing interests. It must be remembered, however, that most
of these states augmented their territorial waters when the validity of
the contiguous zone alternative was as much in issue as that of the
twelve-mile territorial sea. The chances were good that either course
would have been condemned as illegal under customary international
law, 1 2 so a nation cannot be blamed for having chosen the course
offering the more attractive reward of an extended national boundary
But the disreputable contiguous fisheries zone of yesterday has be-
come predominant international practice; concurrence by the United
States was all that was needed to punctuate its respectability It is to
be expected, therefore, that the contiguous fisheries zone will stand as
a more attractive alternative than in the past. If the fisheries zone does
not become the option of a greater percentage of nations seeking to
protect their fisheries, it will be because the twelve-mile territorial sea
has also become more respectable than previously, not because the
United States has created a fisheries zone. If anything, it would appear
that the fisheries zone alternative will detract from the reputation of
the extended territorial sea as the only solution.
The second possibility is that the international community will
misconstrue the United States legislation as a total abandonment of
the three-mile limit. Countries searching for precedent to support
their twelve-mile territorial seas might be expected to allege that the
United States now maintains "sovereignty" to such extent. Today, such
assertions would be unfounded. Grotius himself considered the free-
dom of the seas largely a fumction of the freedom to fish on the high
1 00 McDouGAL & Bu=m, op. cit. supra note 58, at 453.
10 1 See State Dep't synoptical table m House Hearings 275-77.
102 Writers were having no difficulty in concluding that the "question of exclusive
fishing nghts within the contiguous zone has never been sanctioned by international
law." Yalem, The International Legal Status of the Territorial Sea, 5 VmL. L. REv. 206,
211 (1960). See Lawrence, supra note 98, at 51; Comment, 62 MicH. L. IExv. 848, 864
(1964).
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seas.10 3 It was this historical sentiment which caused the dual con-
sideration of the territorial sea and the contiguous fisheries zone at the
two Geneva conferences. Nations had not yet developed an ability or
a willingness to compart their analysis: the questons of the breadth
of territorial waters and that of the fisheries zone were repeatedly
bonded together in compromise proposals. At that time, it was no
small accomplishment for the delegations to examine the contiguous
fisheries zone at all, let alone accord it the higher recognition of a
separate convention. Entangled as the two issues were, it was mevi-
table that failure to solve one would frustrate solution of the other. It
should be apparent from what has been covered to this point that such
a confused approach has nothing m the law of maritime ]urisdiction
as support. However intimate may have been the past relation be-
tween exclusive fishing and the territorial sea, contemporary practice
has come to treat the two as severable. Exclusive fishery control is
much less than territorial sovereignty, and nations can expect no re-
spectable support in refusing to recognize the distinction between the
two. The conclusion follows that the United States fisheries zone will
receive a generally sympathetic reception by the world community
Nations and Interests Particularly Affected
It is doubtful that enforcement will cause specific disagreements
with nations whose vessels have fished within this twelve-mile zone.
The Soviet Umon'0 4 and Canada'0 5 have twelve-mile zones of their
own, so they will not be heard to complain. Korea clamis the conti-
nental shelf, which means 200 miles in some areas.10 The only other
nation involved is Japan, which claims a three-mile fishing limit'07 and
works intensively in the fishing grounds off our Pacific shores. Upon
learning of the impending fisheries limit, Japan formally notified the
United States of its reservation of fishing rights. 08
Although Japan has been as yet the only country to make it an
issue, the inaugural difficulty with this legislation will probably be the
103 "Grotius viewed interference with the freedom to fish as an even more
serious offense than the blocking of navigation." Svarlien, Territorial Sea: A Quest for
Uniformity, 15 U. FLA. L. Rv. 333, 346 (1962).
o4 For a thorough account of Russia's history in this regard, see JOHNsTON, THE
INTEPiNATIoNAL LAW OF FisHE ms 212 (1965).
105 It is interesting to note that the Canadian zone is also measured from the
boundary of the territorial sea. Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, 13 Eliz. 2, c. 22
(1964); likewise, the New Zealand act describes a nine-mile zone measured from the
boundary of the three-mile territorial sea. Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act 1965
(1965, No. 11). Perhaps the draftsmen of our statute were inspired by recent Common-
wealth practice.
106 House Hearings 276.
107 Ibd.
108 Per Raymund T. Yingling, id. at 281.
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determination of historic fishing rights. The President may make ex-
ceptions for "traditional" fishing rights; this determination is a factual
one, °10 and decisions regarding each of the four countries concerned
might be expected to vary The matter is largely analogous to the law
of prescriptive rights, and the duration, frequency, and nature of the
fishing activity would have to be basic considerations. Korea, it seems,
has nothing upon which to claim an exception; Korean vessels have
only recently entered the affected waters.110 Quite to the contrary is
the situation of Canada. The United States and Canada have fished
in each other's coastal waters for many years. Canada has allowed
United States vessels to continue traditional fishing within its new
twelve-mile zone. 1 There is no question that the United States will
reciprocate by allowing Canadian craft to fish within three miles of
the United States coast.1 12 Between these two extremes, however, lie
the cases of Japan and the Soviet Union, both of which began accel-
erated programs of fishing in our coastal waters during the 1950's.13
It is not proposed to examine the probable outcome of this historic
rights question. It would seem evident that Japan has a political edge
over its contender."1 4
The fisheries bill was endorsed by every department called upon
for opunon." 5 The bill was challenged by the single voice of the
Pacific tuna fleet, operating chiefly out of Southern California ports.
The tuna interests were concerned that our unilateral extension would
add credence to the exorbitant 200-mile claims of Chile, Ecuador and
Peru," 6 off whose coasts the tuna fleet operates. The imaginative argu-
ments against the twelve-mile bill were properly downplayed by Con-
109 Id. at 283.
110 See Pacific Fisherman, Sept. 1966, p. 22.
111 See JoHntsTo, op. cit. supra note 104, at 205; House Hearings 302.
112The Department of the Interior has reported that "substantial fishing operations
by foreign fishermen over a long period of years" can be found only in favor of Canadian
fishermen. House Hearings 283.
113 Testimony of Harold E. Lokken, manager, Fishing Vessel Owners' Ass'n of
Seattle, in House Hearings 306.
114 On February 13, 1967, the United States and the Soviet Umon signed a treaty
giving fishing rights to the Soviets within the twelve-mile zone off certain parts of the
coast of Alaska. Loading operations, but not fishing rights, were allowed in the zone off
the Oregon and Washington coasts. N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1967, § C, p. 18, col. 6.
115 This included the Department of Defense. Rear Admiral Wilfred Hearn, Judge
Advocate General of the Navy, told the House subcommittee that any extension beyond
twelve miles would be illegal, however. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Sept. 1966,
p. 154; House Hearings 340.
116 At the Santiago Conference in 1952, Chile, Ecuador and Peru "made the 200
mile zone their common cause and reiterated their position that this area of the high
seas, including the sea bed and its subsoil, is 'subject to the exclusive sovereignty' of
these countries, only 'innocent and moffensive passage' excepted." BAxrrcH, LmN -
AmucAN LA:w oF FxsHEwms 16 (1957).
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gress. By its action, the United States has recognized only a contiguous
fisheries zone of twelve miles; our tuna vessels will still have the sup-
port of the United States while working the waters beyond twelve
miles off the South American coast. The United States has not recog-
nized the exclusive competence of a state to determine its own juris-
dictional limits. The twelve-mile law has snply brought the United
States in line with what has become customary international law The
200-mile claim continues as an oddity in international practice, and
the position of the United States as to the illegality of such a claim
remains quite sound.
If the 200-mile limit is anomalous today, it could become vogue
tomorrow The tragedy of the twelve-mile limit is that it will not do
its job: the Soviet fleet took few fish within the twelve-mile zone;" 7
and, unless current discussions produce a workable conservation pro-
gram, the threat of depletion to Pacific salmon stocks will not diminish.
Indeed, it was recognized from the beginning that a twelve-mile bill
would be but a token measure of protection.""' The twelve-mile limit,
it must be remembered, was the least drastic of all proposals offered
for solution. The salmon industry would have had us declare the con-
tinental shelf as the limit."9
It is hoped that the United States will not be caught up in the
frenzy of protectiveness which has compelled some states to make
exaggerated unilateral claims. Our countervailing interest in the free-
dom of the seas will likely prevent such a development. But the issue
of shared fishery exploitation will not disappear. The unabating quest
for food will ultimately lead us to the ocean's bounty-and unless
means are devised by which the harvest will be allocated to all, it will
unavoidably go only "to the most ruthless and the most powerful."120
The solution lies not in greater exclusive control of offshore fisheries;
this has been recognized too often for further discussion. 21 The course
must be that of progressive multilateral agreement. The machinery
"17 Fishing Gazette, Aug. 1966, p. 54. See note 2 supra.
118 See statement of Donald L. McKernan, director of the Bureau of Commercial
Fisheries, in Fishing Gazette, Aug. 1966, p. 54.
119 Typical of the salmon interests was the Congress of American Fishermen, which
called for a limit of 200 miles "or a limit to include the continental shelf, whichever is
greater." Pacific Fisherman, June 1966, p. 25.
120 McDouGAL & BumxE, TAE PuBLic ORDER OF T=E OCEANs 562 (1962).
121 Id. at 453, 500. See Phleger, Recent Developments Affecting the Regime of the
High Seas, 32 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 934, 940 (1955), where it is stated: "The answer is
not to be found in disregarding existing international law by unilateral extension
The alternative is a program of conservation of fisheries-the application by international
agreement of control based on scientific principles." A political realist looks at the pos-
sibility of effective conservation programming in New Statesman, Aug. 23, 1958, p. 218.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
COMMENTS
of an enforceable 122 conservation system of regional plans cannot be
too idealistic for consideration.
CONCLUSION
The United States fisheries zone is a significant development m
the law of jurisdiction m coastal waters. It does not transcend the
present limits of customary international law, nor does it jeopardize
the already stultified position of the United States on the three-mile
territorial sea. Adamant interests in this country, as elsewhere, can be
expected to demand expansions of the exclusive fisheries zone. The
United States has now reached the outer limit permitted by interna-
tional law, and therefore has both the position and the responsibility
to work for international agreement on shared exploitation of the
oceans.
:2 2 Enforceability cannot be overlooked. Too many present conservation programs
have no such feature. An example is the Inter-Amencan Tropical Tuna Commission,
which annually "recommends" catch limits to the tuna fleets. These quotas have never
been followed m the Commision's 18-year history. Pacific Fisherman, June 1966, at
p. 10.
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